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Tracking the Lacanian unconscious in language  
 
Derek Hook 
 
Department of Psychosocial Studies, Birkbeck College, University of London & 
Department of Psychology, University of the Witwatersrand 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper makes two contributions to the emerging field of 
Lacanian Discourse Analysis (LDA), one by way of theoretical exposition, a 
second oriented toward the challenges of empirical analysis. In the first section 
of the paper I illustrate and develop upon the elusive Lacanian notion of the 
unconscious structured as a language. This discussion yields a series of 
important ideas: the assertion that a matrix of latent significations shadows 
any utterance; the distinction between statement/enunciation; and the 
concept of repression-in-language. These concepts provide a platform for the 
second section of the paper which draws on textual material collected by the 
Apartheid Archive Project (AAP) in order to demonstrate a particular 
procedure of LDA. This procedure entails an attention to discontinuous 
narrative components and the role of symbolic juxtapositions. It points, 
furthermore, to the value of making novel combinations of given textual 
elements as a way of querying what may be repressed in the text. Two 
important conclusions are drawn from this discussion, each of which indicates 
a priority for Lacanian practice. Firstly, the idea that the ongoing work of 
symbolic juxtaposition may be more profitable than ‘depth’ interpretations in 
conducting analysis. Secondly, that facilitation of lateral significations and 
associated significations should take priority over the aim of extracting a single 
over-arching message. 
 
 
Keywords: Discourse analysis, Lacan, repression, unconscious, symbolic 
juxtaposition 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I have two basic objectives in this paper, both of which inform the procedures 
and conceptualization of both Lacanian Discourse Analysis (LDA) and clinical 
practice. In the first half of the paper, I develop a series of arguments in 
respect of how we need to understand that most elusive of psychoanalytic 
notions, namely the Lacanian unconscious. Doing so will set the scene for a 
practical example of how one might utilize LDA in respect of narrative texts. 
The narrative material I draw on here stems from the Apartheid Archive 
Project. My attempt here is not to develop a series of methodological steps for 
a version of LDA. Neither is it to become bogged down in the theoretical 
minutia of Lacanian jargon. My agenda is rather to explore a series of 
implications of Lacan’s important conceptualization of the unconscious which 
will, in turn, open up practical possibilities for a psychoanalytic analysis of 
textual material. I should note here, following Thom (1981), that any attempt 
to reduce the complexity of Lacan’s thought in favour of accessibility, runs the 
risk of simplification, of engendering misleading assimilations of his ideas. Such 
is the risk I take here.  
 
 
 
Unintended hearings 
How are we to understand Lacan’s famous (2006a) declaration that ‘the 
unconscious is structured like a language?’ Bearing in mind that Lacanian 
theory ultimately aims to inform clinical practice – a fact sometimes 
overlooked by Lacan’s more abstruse commentators – it seems worthwhile to 
offer to explore some practical applications of this idea.  
 One way of exploring Lacan’s maxim is with reference to Bill Clinton’s 
infamous insistence “I did not have sexual relations with that woman”. We 
might find support from an unlikely source here, namely discursive 
psychology’s attempts at a revised understanding of ‘Freudian repression’ 
(Billig,1999). Proponents of discursive psychology emphasize that it is quite 
possible for an audience to hear in given expressions something quite different 
to what the speaker had intended. 
 
This possibility of unintended hearing arises for the dual reason that all 
expressions leave some things unsaid and what is said can be understood in 
more than one way…Expressions do not exhaust the possibility of their meaning 
(Durrheim, Mtose & Brown, 2010, pp. 174-175). 
 
Although many such social psychological engagements with the notion of 
repression are explicitly anti-Lacanian (Billig, 1999, 2006), the above 
understanding fits perfectly with a Lacanian approach to communication. From 
such a perspective, every statement brings in its wake a series of variations, 
every utterance exists within a horizon of differing formulations. This is part of 
what Lacan draws from Saussure’s (1916) structural linguistics: the idea that 
language contains in itself no positive or inherently-meaningful values. 
Language works rather as a differential system in which effects of meaning are 
achieved by an ongoing play of difference, by a series of ‘not’, and ‘different to’ 
qualifications. That is to say, a given signifier – i.e. a word, an acoustic trace, a 
physical mark or gesture – comes to mean something only by virtue of 
differentiation, by means of its difference from surrounding and similar terms. 
(In structural linguistics, a signifier – a mark or a sound – needs to be 
considered alongside a ‘signified’, that is, the concept, the idea attaching to the 
signifier. The combination of these elements gives us a sign (Saussure, 1916)). 
Saussure’s (1916) idea that successfully meaningful instances of 
language are reliant on a series of ‘not’ and ‘different to’ qualifications implies 
that if we have understood a given message, we have also grasped a matrix of 
possible alternative significations, a series of different potential significations. 
We would not have properly understood a given assertion if this were not the 
case, if it were not contextualized by a series of varying – and opposed - 
significations and interpretations. Without launching into a long technical 
digression of Saussure’s linguistics, let me simply emphasize one point that will 
prove crucial in what follows. What is conveyed in a communicative exchange 
is not merely a minimal, stripped-to-the-core message, but also a number of 
subsidiary – and potentially proliferating – associated significations. This alerts 
us to a point of Lacanian psychoanalytic technique that I will expand upon as 
we continue, the idea that the facilitation of a series of lateral significations 
may take priority over the aim to extract a single over-arching message. 
 
Statement/enunciation 
 
A further Lacanian notion may assist us in expanding upon the idea of 
unintended hearing. This is the notion of the inevitable split between 
statement and enunciation. This incommensurability between statement and 
enunciation, that is, between the content of a given communication and the 
performative conditions of its utterance, is irreducible in Lacanian thought. 
Simply put: the breadth of how I might be interpreted always exceeds the 
more delimited field of what I had intended to say. This mismatch might be 
exacerbated by a number of factors: the tonal variations of my voice, the 
‘materiality’ of how I speak (patterns of pronunciation, enunciation, etc.), or 
the related bodily gestures present in the moment of expression. From a 
Lacanian perspective, the fact of this gap or irreconcilability cannot be 
overcome, it qualifies all communication and it ensures that a minimal entropy 
characterizes each instance of speaking. A seemingly sincere compliment may 
be accompanied by a gesture which causes one to call the remark into 
question; the deadpan delivery of a comment may leave one wondering 
whether in fact it was meant sarcastically.  
This cues us into a particular way of listening: not to attend to sense, to 
intended meaning, but to the continual mismatch between enacted 
enunciation and apparently intended meaning. The form of how something is 
said may cause us to call into question the content of what is being offered. 
The repetitive insistence ‘I did not do it!’, may, for example, give rise to the 
suspicion in the listener that the opposite is the case. Similarly, the content 
may act as a check upon the form, as in the case when the (ostensibly earnest) 
performance of apology is ruined when the speaker lets slip a word betraying 
their true (very different) feelings. 
 The chief assertion of this introductory section is a basic one: language is 
always open to (other) interpretation(s); what has been said is never all. What 
clinical psychoanalysis seeks to facilitate, and what LDA is particularly attentive 
to, are those disruptive or surprising “opening of the unconscious” where 
other possible significations can be read out of an expressive attempt at 
communication. I have stressed two possible listening strategies that follow on 
from this objective. An attention, firstly, to the category of variant 
significations and interpretations latent within what has been said. Secondly, a 
sensitivity to mismatches between content and enunciation, to the 
discrepancy between what has been said and how it has been said as a means 
of opening up alternative readings of the material. 
 
“I did not have sexual relations with that woman” 
“You did not have sexual relations with that woman. What other woman did 
you have sexual relations with?”, such would be one response to Clinton’s 
statement. Another, taking into account the legal ambiguity of Clinton’s appeal 
to “sexual relations”: “You say you didn’t have “sexual relations” with her. 
What kind of other sexual activity did you engage in with her?”. Or: “The force 
of your denial that YOU DID NOT have sexual relations with that woman makes 
me think that you most certainly did”.  
Here we return to an idea introduced above: any communicative 
statement conveys along with it a matrix of alternative readings of what is 
being said. Or, differently put, there is a framework of intelligibility that 
accompanies any statement, that supports multiple grammatical permutations 
of a given assertion, and which thus affords different possible hearings. More 
simply yet, we might simply underscore the provisional nature of any message. 
How it connects up to the context within which it is being relayed; how it is 
related to the imagined intent of the speaker; the conditions of exactly how it 
is uttered, performed and why: all of these considerations mean that a 
message remains – even if perfectly legible and understood - ‘incomplete’, 
open to scrutiny.  
That a given message (“I did not have sexual relations with that 
woman”) brings with it a grid of grammatical permutations is easy to 
demonstrate. As suggested above, we could subject this statement to 
substitutions of object and verb (i.e. “I did not have sex with ‘a’ [but with b]” 
(change of object); “I did not ‘c’ with that woman [but I did ‘d’ with her]” 
(change of verb)). Likewise, we could suspend the negation in such a statement 
changing “I did not have sexual relations with…” simply to “I did have sexual 
relations with…”. We need to bear in mind, furthermore, that a statement 
unfolds in time and that the first clause of a sentence cannot properly be 
understood until we hear what follows on from it. We could as such ask 
ourselves what effects of meaning are put in play by positing a conjunction (“I 
did not have sexual relations with that woman but/although/and then…”) or 
simply by suspending the ‘closure’ of ending the sentence, and experimenting 
with what might emerge: “(I did not have sexual relations with that 
woman….”…[“although I certainly tried to”]).  
In this brief discussion we have of course by no means exhausted the 
elaborative permutations of Clinton’s statement. (The possibility of an 
active/passive reversal regards the verb of the statement gives us another 
humorous way of responding to Clinton: “You did not have sexual relations 
with that woman…but did she have sexual relations with you?”) I hope here 
simply to have indicated the proliferation of unintended hearings that are 
latent in even in a straightforward assertion and in this way point to the 
immense generative potential of language – indeed, of the signifier – to 
overrun any one single trajectory of meaning. 
Before drawing this section to a close, it is worthwhile briefly mentioning 
the description Fink (2004) offers, derived from Lacan, of analysts listening to 
their patients’ speech as if it were a musical score. The type of listening we 
practice in everyday conversation is akin, in this comparison, to hearing a piece 
of music and attending only to the dominant harmony. This much is to be 
expected: conversational interactions are successful largely because we have 
learnt to screen out the multiple ambiguities, the unexpected implications and 
discomforting associations that are latent in any instance of speech. By 
contrast, psychoanalytic listening bears comparison with the listening skills of 
the trained musician, who remains  attuned to the various, overlapping and co-
present sounds of various instruments, each of which makes their (often 
unnoticed) contribution to the overall music. The importance of this 
illustration lies not only in how it emphasizes the importance of attending to 
multiple layers of signification. It is informative also in stressing the spiralling 
complexity of signification that becomes apparent when multiple layers of 
potential meaning play off one another in different ways over a period of time.  
 
The repressed as the return of the repressed 
 
Lacan (1988) offers us the notion that the return of the repressed and the 
repressed are one and the same. This assertion is strictly correlative to the idea 
that the unconscious is not an internal space or mentality. The Lacanian 
unconscious is not a ‘depth psychology’, an irreducibly intra-psychic collection 
of contents and impulses. It is, by contrast, an ‘external’ unconscious, which is 
fashioned out of, made possible by practices of language, by the utilization and 
arrangement of words, signifiers. It is important to stress the idea of the 
signifier here as broader than words alone, because after all, images are 
signifiers, as are semaphores and instances of sign language, each of which 
fulfil the function of a signifier. That is to say, each of these examples can be 
read, they convey meaning for someone – indeed, for an other - even if what 
they signify is not always immediately evident. Furthermore, as is the case for 
all signifiers for Lacan, they are polyvalent, they are able to carry more than 
one possible meaning simultaneously. How then to approach Lacan’s idea that 
the repressed and the return of the repressed are one and the same? By taking 
seriously for the moment that in speaking I create the possibility of a repressed 
(or, more accurately, of a potential ‘return of the repressed’). 
Let us resort to an example. I once invited a famous colleague to a 
dinner-party, aware that her presence would make a memorable night for my 
other guests. Afterwards I felt guilty, because my colleague had to suffer the 
overbearing attentions of my friends. I resolved to apologize, until I realized 
that to apologize would alert her to the fact that I had something to be guilty 
for. “Why would he apologize?” she might have asked herself. After all, it may 
not have entered her mind that I had anything to apologize for. The 
inappropriate behaviours of my friends wasn’t something that I was necessarily 
responsible for, unless of course I had contrived the situation precisely to 
impress those friends. To let her know that I felt guilty would be to indicate 
something of my complicity in the situation. This calls to mind the cliché of the 
guilty husband whose gift of flowers makes his otherwise trusting wife start to 
suspect that something is up. 
The beauty of these examples is that my famous colleague, like the wife 
who has received flowers, may not have had any idea at all about the ‘guilty 
truth’ in question. There was no inner psychology, no “intra-psychic” repressed 
material: it was only by virtue of what was said or expressed that a ‘repressed’ 
was created. To be clear on this point: in Lacan’s understanding of ‘the return 
of the repressed’ there needs be no existing ‘dirty secret’. This would be the 
case where the husband gave flowers on a whim without having anything to 
hide. All that is hence required is a signifier – the act of giving flowers – that 
causes one to start questioning its broader significance. The act of speaking, 
the subtleties of communication, this is all that is required for a ‘repressed’ to 
come into play. Such signifiers are condition of possibility enough to ignite a 
thought, a suspicion, a question, and once this is in place (a ‘return of the 
repressed’) then there effectively will have been – that is to say retrospectively 
– a repressed.  
 
Indefinite meaning 
 
We can add a further layer to our developing account of mishearing and an 
‘external’ unconscious. Even if one has perfectly understood the words of an 
other’s utterance, the act of them being spoken still poses a question as to 
their underlying pragmatic function. For Lacan (1981), conveyed meaning is 
never static, but is always subject to further articulation, indeed, to the 
question “Why are you telling me this now, in the particular way that you are?” 
Any communicative utterance is thus, to some degree, held in ‘suspense of 
finalization’.  
As such, any communicative instance might form the basis of the ‘return 
of the repressed’. It is worthwhile stressing the prospect of uncertainty that 
shadows the signifier. The signifier – and the act of giving flowers again serves 
as a good example here – is never, as one might put it, completely 
domesticated. It is never afforded a single, definitive ‘once-and-for-all’ 
interpretation. Various other signifieds may be attached to it; I may not at first 
realize what I am saying in saying something. One appreciated thus that 
signifiers provide the ‘material’, the apparent evidence that brings a repressed 
possibility to light. Consider the following scene: a woman watching her 
partner chatting to his secretary at a Christmas party, suddenly detects an 
inappropriate gesture, a giveaway sign that, she thinks, betrays that they are 
having an affair. One should note the odd temporality underpinning this logic: 
the ‘repressed’ here, the fact of the apparent affair, did not exist as ‘repressed’ 
until it came to light. The ‘repressed’ in effect did not exist, until the observing 
woman is confronted with the ‘return of the repressed’. Although this may 
seem an unfamiliar conceptualization of the repressed, it of course accords 
with Freud’s (1950) notion of deferred action, that is, with the idea of 
retrospective causality whereby a current event (typically, for Freud, of a 
traumatic sort) triggers the latent impact of an earlier incident. What is also 
notable about Lacan’s approach to this question is that he attempts to 
understand repression not as a psychological quality or function, but as a 
potentiality within the signifying field. Repression of this order – which is to say 
secondary repression – is thus contingent upon language, or, more accurately, 
the reception and production of signifiers, whose meaning is never completely 
fixed.  
This point is worth reiterating: Lacan’s notion of the unconscious is not 
thus ‘psychological’ - certainly not in any narrow sense of the word - but rather 
‘linguistic’ in its functioning. (Or, taking Miller’s (2011) lead, we may speak 
simply of the linguistic structure of psychology). This then is one way of 
understanding Lacan’s ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’, namely 
that the unconscious is brought about by – and is hence contingent upon - the 
productions of language (or indeed, of signifiers). Such an unconscious would 
be undoubtedly complex, evidently so if we consider the multitude of 
proliferating interpretations sustained by any ongoing instance of linguistic 
production. It would also, however, be an omnipresent potentiality, by which I 
mean to stress that it exists as a possibility whenever there is a communicative 
exchange, or, indeed, the use of language. 
 
Bridging disjuncture 
 
One of the themes in the above discussion has been the idea that the 
unconscious, while an omnipresent potential, is never simply evident. I have 
tried to emphasize how it may be necessary to employ a matrix of latent 
significations to make guesses at what is ‘repressed’ within a given utterance. I 
want now to extend something of this idea by considering the possibility of 
juxtaposing seemingly discontinuous narrative elements. 
 The case of two seemingly disconnected scenes that need to be 
juxtaposed is any indication of the unconscious is to be gained is no doubt 
familiar to analysts. A personal example suffices. I started a session (as an 
analysand) complaining about a work colleague who had (I thought) unfairly 
snubbed me. I discussed some other banal daily experiences and then recalled 
an incident in a prison where I used to work as a lay counsellor. A prisoner had 
told me how he never lost his temper. Should someone do him an injustice he 
would patiently bide his time, wait till that person was at his ease,  then stab 
him in the back. No great analytical ability is needed to pose an interpretative 
hypothesis here: I wanted to stab my work colleague in the back. 
  This is of course a crude example, and the tentative reading I have 
suggested remains open to different interpretations. One might speculate that 
the desire in question was far more paradoxical or masochistic in nature, that, 
for example, I may have wished that I be stabbed in the back. It is worth 
stressing this point so as to avoid the pattern of formulaic interpretations that 
the worst of psychoanalysis is infamous for (i.e. the superimposition of a series 
of caricatured themes, penis envy, Oedipal desire, castration anxiety, etc. as 
pertinent explanatory scripts for virtually any situation). 
What the stabbing example brings home is that unconscious desire is 
never simply stated, afforded first-person propositional form. It emphasizes 
the importance of attending to the form of what is being said. A prospective 
truth of desire is not simply pictured, given obvious possessive expressive form 
(“I want to….”); it appears instead, rather as a result of the combination of 
elements. That is to say, unconscious desire might be accessed not simply 
through explication, but via the work of juxtaposition. We might treat this, 
precisely the work of symbolic juxtaposition, as a methodological maxim for 
LDA. Lapping (2011) makes a similar point in her discussion of psychoanalytic 
social research. She (2011) stresses the need to identify associative tugs 
against dominant narratives, and emphasizes the importance of “attending to 
elements that connote symbolic relations outside…the linear narratives” of a 
dominant discourse (p. 72). Crucially, she also remarks: 
 
[A]pparently cohesive accounts cover over a set of more complicated relations, 
and they pose questions that invert the obviousness of what they are seeing… 
[D]ominant discourse is unsettled by the construction of a symbolic 
juxtaposition (p. 72). 
 
As Leader (2003) notes, Freud’s description of dream-pairs proves a helpful 
means of expanding upon this idea of symbolic juxtaposition. If a dream-wish 
has as its content some forbidden behaviour towards an individual, says Freud, 
“then that person may appear in the first dream undisguised, while the 
behaviour is only faintly disguised” (1932, p. 27). In the second dream however 
we would expect that “[t]he behaviour will be openly shown…but the person 
made unrecognizable…[or] some indifferent person substituted for him” (p. 
27). Leader (2003) points out that Lacan’s thesis, following the influence of 
Lévi-Strauss, advances upon Freud’s.  It is not simply the case that a forbidden 
thought would be disguised, hidden via means of substitutions of subject, 
object or indeed act itself – although presumably one would want to keep such 
a possibility open – it is rather that the forbidden thought “only exists…as a 
slippage between the one and the other” (p. 44). The example Leader provides 
is instructive: 
 
A man has two dreams… In one, he loses a blood-soaked tooth and stares at it in 
absolute horror. In the other, his penis is being examined in a medical test and 
no problems are found. Neither of the dreams represents castration as such, but 
it is in the relation between the two that the reference is to castration is situated 
(2003, p. 44). 
 
Leader’s conclusion?  “When something cannot be expressed as a meaningful 
proposition, it will take the form of a relation between two sets of elements” 
(p. 47). 
 
Apartheid narratives 
 
I want now to turn to an extract drawn from the Apartheid Archive Project. 
Before doing so, it is necessary to add a few contextualizing words on this 
project and thus provide a framework for the analytical undertaking in 
question. The Apartheid Archive Project is an ongoing research project that 
aims to collect narrative accounts from ordinary South Africans about their 
experiences of racism during apartheid and to understand the ongoing effects 
of these experiences in present-day South Africa (for more on the project see 
http://www.apartheidarchive.org/site/). The project aspires not just to record 
these narrative accounts but also to engage analytically and theoretically with 
this material. In these ways the Apartheid Archive Project encourages both a 
commitment to personal remembering and a joint intellectual commitment to 
interrogating narratives rather than taking them at face-value. The range of 
narratives collected by the Project is broad: participants were asked to write 
down and describe their earliest significant experience of racism. The task, 
then, was relatively open-ended and different narrators approached the task in 
different ways.  
My own engagement with the narrative materials of the Apartheid 
Archive took several forms (Hook, 2011a, 2011b). What I want to focus on here 
is what I took to be a particularly puzzling aspect shared by a number of the 
narratives contributed by white South Africans: the role of an animal in their 
discussion of racism. The animal in question seemed often to play an 
important mediating role, the function of which was not immediately obvious. 
My question then was: what type of mediator is the animal in these narratives, 
or, more directly, how did it link the white and black characters in the 
respective narratives, what relation does it support? I quote at length from the 
narrative I wish to focus on: 
 
It is…Sunday afternoon… I need to ask Phyllis something. I burst into her room. 
The door was half shut…but I have no respect for her privacy, there are no 
boundaries between her space and mine. The scene on the bed is a surprise to 
me, I live in the sexually repressive days of apartheid… The beautiful tall man 
enmeshed with Phyllis becomes the hero of my novel written…in the long hours 
of the weekend and evenings….  
 
Of course I am the heroine, but I am myself, not Phyllis, a bit older though as I 
want to be enveloped in his arms too. We are having a relationship across the 
‘colour bar’; he is a young activist…It is 1976, he is becoming increasingly 
politically active. He is a leader. I am in love with him, and of course I am against 
apartheid. He is murdered…at the brutal hands of those masquerading as public 
protectors. I survive, to join the struggle, to tell the tale. Phyllis also plays a role 
in the book, a small part... 
 
Notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, difference and ‘otherness’ are central to my early 
constructions of the world… The community I grow up in is so tightly woven, 
based on notions of a shared history, religion, culture, we only know each 
other… I hardly ever meet or even speak with a member of an ‘other’ 
community….[A]partheid and other discriminatory practices are woven into the 
fabric of our day to day lives, but my primary sense of difference is about who is 
part of my community and who is not.  
 
There are always Black women living with us. Not a part of the family, but living 
on the premises of our home. They perform the submissive role of servant, yet I 
know they have power too. Since my mother is absent, all of us know where we 
can get our comfort, enfolded in the large warmth of our ‘nanny’s’ arms… 
 
Besides my sister [Phyllis]…is my favourite person in the world in those years – 
she is young, beautiful, full of fun…She brought the chicken to our house, which 
became our pet as it raced around our garden clucking. When it disappeared 
one day, only to reappear on our dinner table, my long commitment to 
vegetarianism began! 
 
Sometimes, as we rough and tumble, which I catch a hint of the sweet-sour 
scent of Phyllis’ addiction to alcohol. She also died young, just like my hero, 
ultimately a consequence of the same violence. I found this out much later. I 
never knew her story. I never asked her. Just wrote my own. (Compendium of 
Apartheid Archive narratives, N11, 2010).  
 
Undecidable attachments 
 
The narrator in the above extract bursts in on a sexual scene which spurs on an 
fantasy scenario. The author sees herself, a little older, as the beautiful tall 
man’s lover. There is something cinematic to this imagining (“I am the 
heroine”), which is clearly indexed as fictitious (he becomes “the hero of my 
novel”). Importantly also, there is an element of appropriation here; the 
beautiful man is now her lover and Phyllis is reduced to a minor character. 
Phyllis, in short, becomes the imaginative vehicle that enables the narrator to 
live out the romantic vision of a heroic woman against apartheid.  
The mid-section of the narrative provides some of the socio-historical 
context (a “tightly woven” white community in which “we only know each 
other”) explaining why difference becomes such a fantasmatic (and indeed 
sexual) preoccupation. What also becomes apparent here is the necessity of a 
mediator – an object of sorts – to manage a relationship between the narrator 
and the black domestic worker, a relationship which is both in certain senses 
intimate and yet nonetheless contractual. As has often be noted, the 
conditions of apartheid led to such contradictions, the prospect of loving 
attachments (“comfort, enfolded in the…warmth of our ‘nanny’s arms”) even 
of erotic attraction, occurring within oppressive, racially-structured social 
relations. 
The problem that is constituted by the relationship with Phyllis is 
underscored by the narrator’s comment that her “primary sense of difference 
is about who is part of my community and who is not”. Phyllis, who is both a 
part and not a part of the narrator’s family, thus seems difficult to place. I 
should add here the obvious qualification that the nature of this relationship 
and Phyllis’s potentially ambiguous status within it were of course very well 
defined within the symbolic framework of apartheid itself which provided the 
discourse and associated social norms of “nannies”, “domestic workers”. As 
many of the Apartheid Archive narratives make abundantly clear, apartheid 
values were thoroughly ingrained within white South African children who 
understood their prerogatives all too well. Crucial to grasp however is that 
apartheid ideology nonetheless exhibited clear social contradictions that could 
not always be explained away, and that – as in the following narrative – 
inevitably sparked a type of fantasy, which we can understand in a Lacanian 
way as an attempt to mediate, make sense of, social roles and identities. 
These considerations go some way to explaining what at first seems an 
anomalous component in the unfolding narrative: the chicken that  becomes 
the family pet and that abruptly turns up on the dinner-table, igniting thus the 
narrator’s commitment to vegetarianism. Although this may appear a relatively 
arbitrary component of the narrative, there is much of significance in this 
seemingly trivial element. The chicken is a pet, a designation that places child 
and animal in appropriate domestic roles and that affords a familiar and thus 
stable familial ‘object-relation’. The chicken is owned and yet – so it would 
seem – loved. There is a proprietal relationship in place which has not 
precluded the development of ties of affection. The text implies that the 
narrator was saddened by the loss of the pet, although this loss nonetheless 
benefits her. The animal serves an important purpose even in its demise: it 
becomes the basis of the narrator’s ideological commitment to vegetarianism. 
The link between Phyllis and the chicken is not only metonymic (the 
chicken is an extension of Phyllis who “brought [it]…to the house”). “Phyllis 
also died young” the text tells us, introducing an ambiguity: who might the 
‘also’ refer to (the young hero no doubt, but also, given its proximity in the 
text, the chicken?). There is a parallel between Phyllis and the pet here in view 
not only of their sudden deaths, but in terms of how each benefits the identity 
of the narrator; each is the basis of a type of appropriation. As noted above, 
Phyllis provides the materials of a story that the narrator crafts about herself, a 
story which would appear to be crucial to her formative political identity. This 
is a non-reciprocal and an unequal borrowing. Phyllis provides the imaginative 
basis for the narrator’s story about herself; she becomes essentially a device in 
the narrator’s own self-fashioning, her own perspective, her own ‘real’ story 
never being involved (“I never asked her. Just wrote my own”).    
What does such an associative link  tell us? Is this a case of the disguise-
by-way-of-substitution that Freud discusses in dream pairs? Or are the 
narrative elements in a Lacanian manner as suggestive of an unconscious idea 
that exists only as a possible intercalation between components? The task then 
is to consider what the result would be of superimposing these narrative 
pieces. Such a conjunction, I think, provides one way of telling us something 
about the relationship to Phyllis that cannot otherwise be admitted. As is by 
now evident, Phyllis is ‘owned’ by the family, the narrator has certain ‘rights of 
privilege’ over her as a condition of such an unequal relationship. Phyllis cares 
for, gives happiness and love to these children, yet seems ultimately to be 
discarded by the white family (“she…died young…I found this out much later”) 
who appear to have known little about her life (“I never knew her story”).  
This is not to cast aspersions on the genuine love and affection felt by 
the narrator for Phyllis. Then again, the nature of this affection should be 
qualified. We might say then, following the implication of overlaying  these 
narrative components, that Phyllis’s relation to the family is akin, in many 
ways, to that of a pet. As disturbing as such an association as this is – one 
which remains necessarily speculative, based on a provisional reading of the 
‘unconscious’ of the text - it is not particularly surprising given the racist social 
conditions of apartheid itself.  Mbembe (2001) for example lists a series of 
such unspoken assumptions made of the black subject of (neo)colonial 
servitude, who, in varying circumstances, is considered as equivalent to an 
object, a form of property, an animal, a type of natural resource, and so on. 
Gordon (1995) moreover warns that the presence of love on behalf of whites 
for blacks by no means eradicates all traces of racism; one can love another in 
the same way, he notes, as one loves an animal. 
 
Wild (discourse) analysis 
 
My aim in analysing this material is not to pin a charge of racism on the author. 
A discourse analysis is by definition focussed on the broader discursive 
currents animated within the language productions of the speaker, not on the 
singular speaker themselves. My objective is to show how the text might be 
said to speak beyond itself, to extract something that is implied but not 
explicitly said by the text. These methodological provisos in place, it is 
nonetheless necessary to stress again the problematic epistemological status 
of what I am asserting of the text (i.e. the idea that Phyllis’s relation to the 
family is akin to that of a pet). This idea is nowhere stated in the text; it cannot 
as such be ascribed to the author. The argument could just as well be made 
that this idea exists more in the mind of the interpreter than in the author of 
the text; as Pavón Cuéllar (2010) warns, this is a often the lure of imaginary 
understanding in attempts at discourse analysis, that one’s ‘findings’ are 
essentially a projection of the analyst’s own reading.  
To read for the ‘unconscious’ of a text is then perpetually to risk ‘wild 
analysis’. Textual interpretations of this (psychoanalytic) order are thus 
ethically problematic, and not only for the reason that they are very often 
more a function of the reader than of the discourse of the text itself. Such 
interpretative attempts utilize a set of clinical strategies for material over 
which the reader has no clinical warrant. If such interpretations were to be 
utilized in the clinical context they should not take the form of definitive 
declarations on the part of the analyst. If such an interpretative association 
were to be eluded to, it should be done so discretely, gently,  enigmatically 
perhaps, in such a way that the analysand may opt to take it up and develop it 
(or not). This then poses a series of ethical challenges for the prospective use 
of LDA, challenges that need be considered and responded to within the life of 
any given research project.  
 
The ‘trans-individual’ unconscious  
 
It pays here, before closing, to return to our opening discussion of Lacan’s 
(2006a) idea of the unconscious structured like a language. Clearly, there are 
many possible interpretations and uses of this proclamation, whose ambiguity 
and polyvalence I cannot claim to have explored in any systematic way. Let me 
though offer a few thoughts on the implication of this notion for analytic 
practice and theoretically, starting with the idea of a ‘trans-individual’ 
unconscious. 
  It is by now apparent that Lacan’s notion of the unconscious cannot be 
understood along the lines of a depth psychology. Seshadri-Crooks (2000) 
makes this argument to great effect: the unconscious must not be grasped as a 
subterranean space opposed to consciousness, as an inchoate, swirling mass of 
repressed contents. It is neither a primal, archaic function, nor a set of 
unorganized drives and repressed contents. This unconsciousness is activated 
in the operations and performances of language, by virtue of the subject’s 
attempt to make sense of their place in the symbolic order. Lacanians hence 
insist on the idea of an external as opposed to internal unconscious (Pavón 
Cuéllar, 2010), an unconscious that appears within and relies upon the 
production of symbolic exchanges and utterances.  
It is for these reasons that Lacanian theorists prefer the notion of a 
‘trans-individual’ unconscious (Chiesa, 2007; Žižek, 1989) to characterizations 
of either an ‘individual’ or ‘social’ unconscious. Such an unconscious is never 
reducible to the psychical interior of the single subject, for it is reliant upon 
instances of communication, speech, symbolization. Likewise however,   it 
cannot be wholly reduced to the social, because it always necessarily involves 
the subject battling to convey something of the singularity of their desire in 
words which are never perfectly suited to the task of attempted expression. 
 In a discussion of the clinical implications of Lacan’s declaration that the 
unconscious is structured like a language, Miller (2011) draws a number of 
conclusions which apply perfectly to our discussion here. He repeatedly 
stresses Lacan’s insistence that clinicians attend to “the letter of the speech” 
(p. 42) of their patients. The focus in psychoanalytic work should thus remain 
on the verbal productions of patients, on their actual words as opposed to the 
clinician’s own semantic or thematic extrapolations. As straightforward an 
injunction as this is, it can be surprisingly difficult to adhere to. This is 
especially so in a therapeutic culture where interpretations derived from 
counter-transference observations are the norm, and where the patient’s 
affective state is prioritized above and beyond their words. Close attention to 
performances of speech is partly motivated by accuracy. It involves 
 
less of a leap of theoretical faith than does the more common approach which 
takes as its source the inferred content of a patient’s speech and 
behaviour….the letter of the patient’s speech is readily observable (Miller, 2011, 
p. 52). 
 
The implicit warning here is that the process of inferring ideas and intentions 
behind speech typically imports the clinician’s own assumptions. What ends up 
speaking the loudest in the session in such a situation is not the patient’s 
unconscious, but the analyst’s own ego. 
 
Surface rather than depth  
 
Miller (2011) justifies this attention to the letter of the speech also on the basis 
that a patient’s history might be more completely articulated in this way. 
Highlighting unintended significations, slips and “errors” in speech can prompt 
memories that may not have otherwise been accessed. More fundamentally 
yet, attending to the details of linguistic production is crucial inasmuch as this 
is where the unconscious manifests itself, precisely in operations of the 
signifier (displacements, unexpected associations, double meanings, switch-
words, etc). The Lacanian imperative is clear: it is not the transference or the 
affective state of the patient that takes precedence as a means of accessing 
the unconscious, but rather the patient’s use of signifiers. 
 What follows on from these arguments is a de-prioritization of the 
contents of speech, in favour of attention to the ‘lateral movement’ of 
signifiers. So, rather than elevating in importance the semantic substance of 
what is said, the analyst should remain alert to the profusion of unintended 
implications and possible significations (slips, puns, connotations). Hence the 
avoidance of interpretations of ‘deep’ meaning in Lacanian practice in favour 
of the exploration of the verbal bridges and grammatical permutations of a 
given utterance. Parker (in press) puts it this way: Lacanian Discourse Analysis 
“does not burrow underneath language, or inject interpretations into the text”. 
One attends thus to surface rather than depth. The unconscious is not to be 
found ‘behind’ language, or deep ‘inside’ a psyche, but at the level of signifying 
practice. Hence Žižek’s (1989) comment that unconscious desire is not 
concealed within manifest contents, but is decidedly ‘more on the surface’, 
consisting entirely of the signifier’s mechanisms. 
 What is implied here is a desubstantialized notion of the unconscious. If 
language is a differential system with no positive terms, and the unconscious is 
structured like a language – i.e. effectively works like language – then it, the 
unconscious, likewise has no positive terms, no depth, no essential inner 
truths. The unconscious, following this reading, is a differential system which 
functions only, as I have noted above of language, on the basis of an ongoing 
series of ‘not’ and ‘different to’ qualifications. Clinical work then is less a 
striving after definitive conclusions than a case of stoking the productions of 
the unconscious, that is, of opening up, extending, following the patient’s 
signifiers. 
 
Endless desire 
 
By way of conclusion I would like to offer a comment on the above extract 
which responds to the earlier distinction between Freud’s theory of dream-pair 
substitutions and the Lévi-Strauss idea (1963) that one needs to look for a 
relation between elements. What emerges in the above text is not simply a 
case of substitution. Yes, there are a series of telling parallels between Phyllis 
and the pet, and questioning what such a substitution might mean or imply 
would perhaps be a useful analytical exercise. As in the ‘stabbing in the back’ 
episode cited earlier, such an initial substitution (the prisoner’s actions as my 
own desired actions) opened things up, it enabled further questioning of what 
might be repressed. Other possible extrapolations of desire were made 
possible. To fix upon a single substitution as the key would, very possibly, have 
closed down additional interpretative possibilities; my own possible desire to 
be ‘stabbed in the back’ would not have come to light in this way. A further 
interpretative leap was required here; the initial substitution was just the 
springboard for a hypothesis that required elements of both apparently 
disconnected narrative components, but that ultimately proved greater than 
the sum of their parts. 
Levi-Strauss’s (1963) emphasis on the relation between elements within 
the study of myths proves so important to psychoanalysis because it suits an 
engagement with the over-determined nature of psychical material. Levi-
Strauss famously asserted that there is no one totalizing version of the Oedipus 
myth; there are only variants, and the only regularity we can trace within the 
matrix of versions we might plot is that of certain types of relations between 
components. The link to the work of psychoanalysis seems clear: the prospects 
of re-interpretation of any over-determined psychical material means that 
there is never one singular, triumphant interpretation. This provides an 
important ethical guideline for LDA: we do an injustice to the complexity of the 
material in attempting to extract a single over-arching message. And this of 
course allows us to affirm an injunction of Lacanian clinical practice already 
noted, namely that facilitation of lateral significations and associations should 
take priority over the aim of distilling any definitive meaning. 
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